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Analyticity under Perspective:  
Indefinite Generics in French* 
 
Alda Mari 








Starting from the observation that a sentence like ??a dog is intelligent is difficult 
in the generic domain in the same way as ??a student is shy is in the existential 
one, this paper argues that as for the existential reading, the generic interpretation 
of the indefinites also needs a “context”. Adopting an explicit modal interpretation 
of GEN, our account builds on Greenberg (2002) insight that indefinite generic 
sentences require a special kind of modal bases. After pointing out some 
shortcomings of Greenberg’s theory, we propose an account of point of views as 
restrictors of modal bases. We represent point of views as world-judge pairs à la 
Ross (1997) and show that, besides modals, which always rescue indefinite generic 
sentences different phenomena like contrast, focus, evaluative adverbs and 





Since the work of Attal (1976), it is recognized1 that the existential interpretation of 
indefinites in French can only be obtained in thetic sentences (Kuroda, 1975) with 
presentational predicates. 
 
(1)  a.  ??Un élève est timide / A student is shy 
 b.  Un élève est entré / A student came in 
                                                 
*
 I am indebted to Fabienne Martin and Claire Beyssade for long discussions on the topic. Many thanks to 
Jacques Jayez, Marion Carel, Carmen Dobrovie-Sorin and Nathan Klindienst. I would also like to thank 
the audiences of ESSLLI 2007 workshop on Quantifier Modification and of WCCFL 26 to which 
previous versions were presented. All mistakes are mine. 
1See, e.g. Dobrovie-Sorin, 1995 and for English, Ladusaw, 1994; McNally, 1996 and Glasbey, 1998.  





It is also assumed that the generic reading of indefinites is obtained precisely in the 
absence of a situational parameter. This is always the case with i-level predicates 
(Chierchia, 1995), which are considered to be inherently generic. Classically, GEN is 
treated as an unselective quantifier à la Lewis (Lewis, 1975), which relates a restrictor 
and a matrix. The variables in the restrictor are bound by GEN and thus get their generic 
reading. The theory generates as acceptable (2a) – (3a) whose LFs are in (2b) – (3b). 
 
(2) a.  ??Un chien aboie (generic reading) / A dog barks 
 b.  GEN x [dog(x)][barks(x)]  
 
(3) a.  ??Un chien est intelligent (generic reading) / A dog is intelligent 
 b.  GEN x [dog(x)][intelligent(x)]  
 
However, speakers consider (2a) and (3a) very difficult, the same way as (1a) is. They 
often tend to add some extra material, as, for instance, noun modifiers, focus, contrast, 
attitude verbs, and frequency adverbs. These additions are not innocent and need close 
investigation.    
 
It is worth noting that this difficulty is related to indefiniteness. French plural definites, 
which correspond to bare plurals in English (Dobrovie-Sorin, 2007), are usually 
contrasted with indefinites, cf. (4a-b).   
 
(4)  a.  Les chiens aboient / Dogs bark 
 b.  Les chiens sont intelligent / Dogs are intelligent 
 
The difference between generic indefinite sentences and plural definites has been 
traditionally related to the distinction analytic vs. synthetic judgments. It has also been 
put forward that the first ones are only compatible with essential properties, whereas the 
second ones can support non-essential ones (Dähl, 1975; Burton-Roberts, 1977; de 
Swart, 1991).  
 
However, Greenberg (2002) has recently argued that indefinite generic sentences are not 
necessarily associated with essential properties (A carpenter earns very little). 
Nonetheless, the author maintains that indefinite generics do not require verifying 
instances and express a law that does not rely on induction. In an explicit modal 
framework, Greenberg has expressed the distinction between indefinite generic 
sentences and generically interpreted bare nouns by identifying two types of restrictions 
on modal bases (Kratzer, 1981) with respect to which the proposition expressed by the 
two types of sentences are true.  
 
We build on this insight, show that Greenberg choice of accessibility relation is not 
entirely accurate and propose a different criterion for restricting the modal basis, which 
relies on point of views (known as media (Ross, 1997)). Technically, they are 
implemented as world-judge pairs and are sets of content coherent propositions, for a 





given judge. Point of views legitimate generic indefinites. Different syntactic, lexical 
and discursive strategies can serve this purpose.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. We present in section 2 some strategies that speaker 
use to rescue indefinite generic sentences and discuss in section 3 two accounts of 
indefinite generic sentences dedicating a particular attention to Greenberg’s theory. In 
section 4 we first present our account (section 4.1) and then come back to the data 
(section 4.2). The aim of the paper is to indirectly argue that indefinites, no matter 
whether existential or generics, need to be legitimated, and point of views, as sets of 
world-judge pairs, fill this task. That indefinites need an anchoring context is a robust 
observation for French, which cuts across existential readings, generics, and predicative 
uses (Mari and Martin, 2008b). 
 
2 Rescuing strategies 
 
To rescue (2a) and (3a), speakers overwhelmingly rely on contrast, by using appropriate 
prosody. As we argue in the rest of the paper, this is not an innocent feature. Together 
with discursive strategies that enable the use of indefinite generic sentences, they 
explain the conditions of their felicity.    
 
2.1 Modification?  
 
It has been argued that if the subject NP is modified, sentences are better accepted. 
Some authors (e.g. Heyd, 2002; Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari 2007) have proposed that 
only stage level predicates (Carlson, 1977) can rescue the sentences and assume with 
Rooth (1995) that they give rise to when/if paraphrases. (5a) is considered acceptable 
since malade (sick) introduces an event, whereas intelligent does not (6a).  
 
Close investigation of the data shows instead that both stage (5b) and individual level 
predicates (6b) can be used, provided that a contrastive topic (CT) is put in place by 
appropriate stress (see for C-contour in French, Beyssade, Marandin, Rialland, 2003). In 
most of the cases, the comment part also contains a focused constituent. Both (5) and 
(6) can be typically used as an answer to: “Qui est comment?” / Who is how ?  and its 
subquestion:  “Quel type d’enfants est comment?” What kind of children is how?2 (With 
                                                 
2Heyd (2002) has also argued that non predicative adjectives cannot be used as NP-subject modifier. The 
examples are hers. 
  
(i)  *Un éléphant est d’Afrique / An elephant is African 
 *Un éléphant d’Afrique a une corne  / An African elephant has a horn 
 (NB « avoir une corne » is not an essential property of the elephant) 
 
Again, if appropriately focused, these modifiers can also rescue the sentence.  
 





Büring (2003) we assume that focus is needed when alternatives are left open by the 
relevant constituent in the question).  
 
(5)  a.  ??Un enfant malade est grincheux /  A sick child is fussy 
 b.  [Un enfant MAladeF]CT est [GRINcheuxF]COMM  
 
(6)  a.  ??Un enfant intelligent est renfermé / An intelligent child is shy 
 b.  [Un enfant INTelligentF]CT [est RENferméF] COMM  
 
2.2 More on contrast  
 
Similarly, when the contrast is overtly expressed, the sentence is unproblematic, 
provided that appropriate stress is used. Assuming that the question under discussion is 
‘what kind of animal is intelligent?’ (intelligence is given), here are two possible 
answers.  
 
(7) [Un CHIenF]CT [est intelligent]COMM, [un CHATF ]CT [_ NONF]COMM  
 A dog is intelligent, a cat is not  
 
(8) [Un CHIenF]CT [est intelligent]COMM, [un CHATF]CT [_ AUSSIF]COMM  
 A dog is intelligent, cat too 
 
As is well-known, focus in CT introduces the presupposition that there are other 
alternatives for the focused value (e.g. Rooth, 1985, Büring, 2003). The N can be 
simply focused as well. In this case, the contrastive categories are accommodated, a 
(costing3) procedure which, again, can be used felicitously in appropriate discourses.  
 
(9) A: Les enfants, qu’est-ce qui miaule? / Boys, what is that meows?  
 B: [Un CHATF] CT [miaule] COMM / /A CAT  meows 
 
2.3 Propositional attitudes  
 
When the sentence is embedded under a propositional attitude verb, its acceptability is 
restored, with some constraints though. It has first to be noted that lexical differences 
between verbs matter. Trouver (find) support evaluations (10a) better than croire (10a). 
Croire can support questions about a fact as in (10c), which, besides a salient existential 
reading can be interpreted generically; trouver does not support facts under any 
circumstances (10d). 
 
(10)  a.  ?Je crois qu’un chien est intelligent / I believe that a dog is intelligent 
                                                                                                                                               
(ii) Un elephant D’AFRIQUE a une corne / An African elephant has a horn 
3It is worth noting that the strategy is costing, and that speakers might prefer to use a straightforward 
expression, with definite plurals, for instance.  





 b.  Je trouve qu’un chien est intelligent (Ducrot, 1975) / I find that a dog is 
  intelligent 
 c.  Je crois qu’un chien aboie, non? / I believe that a dog barks, isn’t it?  
 d.  *Je trouve qu’un chien aboie, non? / I find that a dog barks, isn’t it?  
 
Trouver does not support mathematical truths (#Je trouve que 2+2=4) or, more 
generally, propositions that can be ascertained as true or false by adding evidence. In 
other terms, trouver only signals the personal view of the speaker leaving open the 
possibility that contradictory propositions are supported by different judges in the same 
world4.  
 
Similarly, the behavior of croire, which is preferably used in approval-requesting-
questions, highlights the fact that the assertion it introduces cannot be freely added to 
the common ground.  
 
When focused, savoir (know) can be used to embed indefinite generic sentences with an 
evaluative predicate.  
 
(11)  a.  *Je sais qu’un chien est intelligent / I know  that a dog is intelligent 
 b.  Je SAIS qu’un chien est intelligent  
 
(11a) has two interpretations: (i) the speaker claims, contrary to the hearer, that a dog is 
intelligent, or (ii) the speaker makes clear that, contrary to what the hearer seems to 
hold, (s)he is aware of the fact that a dog is intelligent. In these two cases, savoir has an 
evidential use, i.e. indicates (a) the source of the evidence is given as well as (b) the 
degree of confidence (Fogelin, 1967 and later Simons, 2007).  
 
Summing up, in all acceptable cases in (10)-(11), a polyphonic (Ducrot, 1984) context is 
put in place, in which the truth of the generic sentence holds for one of the participants 
of the conversation only.  
 
2.4 Frequency adverbs  
 
Besides frequency adverbs (12), which have been convincingly analyzed as counting 
events in which the co-occurrence of the properties expressed by the NP subject and the 
VP is observed (e.g. Rooth, 1995; de Swart, 1991), other adverbs, called expectation 
adverbs, can also improve the acceptability, cf. (13). The event-counting theory cannot 
explain their behavior, though.  
 
(12)  Un chien est souvent intelligent / A dog is often intelligent 
 
                                                 
4In a similar vein, Stephenson (2006) suggests that find can only express an evaluation that is bound to 
the attitude holder.  





(13) [Un chien]TOPIC [est [SANS doute]F intelligent]COMM / A dog is, without any 
 doubt, intelligent 
 
2.5 Modalities  
 
Generic indefinites have been noted as not problematic in modal sentences (Dahl, 1975 ; 
Burton-Roberts, 1977 ; de Swart, 1996 ;  Heyd, 2002 ; Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari, 2007). 
It has been suggested by Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari (ibid.) that modals indirectly induce 
quantification over events. However, the intuition and the formal details are obscure and 
we prefer to adopt a more classical view of modality à la Lewis/Kratzer, as only 
inducing quantification over worlds. It is to be noted that evaluative and factives can be 
used under a modal. 
 
(14)  [Un chien]TOPIC [[peutF] être intelligent]COMM / A dog can be intelligent 
 
(15) [Un [étudiant]F]CT [[peutF] travailler dans cette salle]COMM  
 A student is allowed  to work in this room 
 
2.6 Circumstances  
 
For completeness sake, it is worth noting that indefinite generics with a non-evaluative 
predicate are also better accepted if a frame is provided, which is in a causal relation 
with the content of the generic sentence.  
 
(16) Un chien aboie lorsqu’il a faim / A dog barks when he is hungry 
 
Before we discuss current theories of indefinite generics and propose our account, we 
narrow down the scope of the paper. Firstly, we pay a special attention to evaluative 
predicates. We do not mention either the constraints pending on plural indefinites (see 
Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari, 2007; Mari and Martin, 2008a). Finally, we do not consider 
ce constructions (Un chien, c’est intelligent) which would require a lengthily discussion 
per se (see Carlier, 1996).  
 
3  Parameters for the interpretation of indefinite generics 
 
GEN has been often interpreted in modal terms (Krifka et al. 1995). Under the classical 
account, as pointed by Greenberg (2002), the interpretation of generic indefinites ((2a) 
or (3a)) and bare plurals (4) (plural definites in French) coincide.  
 
Let M = <A,W,R,f>, where A is a set of entities, W a set of worlds, R an accessibility 
relation of maximal similarity and f an assignment function. The explicit modal 
interpretation of GEN (17a) is in (17b).  
 





(17) a.  GEN x [P(x)][Q(x)] 
 b.  ∀w’ [[w’ R w] → ∀x [[P(x,w’)] →[Q(x,w’)]]] 
 
The classical interpretation has been amended in various ways to capture the 
interpretation of generic indefinites specifically. The first amendment we discuss is the 
one involving quantification over events.  
 
3.1 Quantification over events 
 
It has been argued that GEN can bind either individuals or events (e.g. Chierchia, 1995; 
de Swart, 1991). Some authors have distinguished GEN from HAB, but the details of 
this distinction are not unequivocally settled in the literature. For most of the authors, 
GEN (or its HAB version, in this case) counts events and thus binds event variables. 
This seems to straightforwardly apply to frequency adverbs. In (12), souvent (often) is 
taken to count situations in which the intelligence of the dog can be observed. The same 
treatment is probably suitable for case (16). It has also been proposed to extend it to 
cases with modified subject NP that can be paraphrased by a when clause (Heyd, 2002; 
Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari, 2007). In the LF for (5), repeated in (19), GEN is taken to 
count events, and individuals are only indirectly bound to events by the Skolem 
function f (see Dobrovie-Sorin and Beyssade, 2004). 
 
(18)  Un enfant malade est grincheux / A sick child is fussy 
 ∃ f GEN e  [sick(e) & child (f(e))][fussy(f(e))] 
 ∃ f ∀w’ [[w’ R w] → ∀e [[P(e,w’) & S(f(e))] →[Q(x,w’)]]] 
 
Even assuming that this representation only cover the relevant cases, some major 
concerns remain. 1. It simply represents the sickness as the occasion in which a child is 
fussy, and the causal link between the property being sick and the property being fussy, 
is lost. 2. It generates as appropriate sentences such as  
 
(19)  #Un garçon est intelligent dans un train / A boy is intelligent in a train 
 
where in the train provides the event in which being a child and being intelligent are 
verified. The sentence can be acceptable, though, if a causal link between being in the 
train and being intelligent is assumed. 
 
3.2 ‘In virtue of’ accessibility relation  
 
Greenberg takes seriously the fact that indefinite generics are bounded to the expression 
of laws of a nature different than the simple co-occurrence of two events (along the 
lines of the tradition which states that indefinite express analytic laws) or the repetition 
of the manifestation of a property in certain circumstances. However, in view of the fact 
that they do not necessarily require essential properties, e.g. a carpenter earns very 
little, Greenberg looks for a new criterion for the use of indefinite generics.  






Greenberg argues that indefinite generics and generic bare plurals give rise to two 
different kinds of interpretations that can be teased apart by distinguishing two different 
kinds of accessibility relations. Greenberg starts from the three following minimal pairs.  
 
(20) a.  *A room is square 
 b.  Rooms are square 
 
(21) a.  A Norwegian student whose name ends with ‘p’ wears green socks  
  (∃ salient)  
 b.  Norwegian students whose name ends with ‘p’ wear green socks 
 
(22) a.  *An Italian restaurant is closed tonight 
 b.  Italian restaurants are closed tonight 
 
The author labels indefinite generic sentences and bare plural generics as IS and BE 
sentences respectively. BE sentences are claimed to express regularities which are 
expected to hold in worlds maximally similar to ours and express descriptive (inductive) 
generalizations. The classical interpretation of GEN holds for bare nouns and is 
repeated below, where R is maximal resemblance.  
 
(23) A BE sentence is true in w iff: 
 ∀w’ [[w’ R w] → ∀x [[P(x,w’)] →[Q(x,w’)]]] 
 
Contrary to BE sentences, IS sentences are claimed to only be able to express "in virtue 
of” generalizations, i.e. deductive generalizations. The modal interpretation of indefinite 
generics accommodates a property in virtue of which the generalization holds. The 
accommodated property (S) is "associated" to the NP property (P). The notion of 
association is defined as in (25):  
 
(24) Association: S is associated with P in w iff ∀x[P(x) → S(x)] holds in all worlds 
epistemically/deontically/stereotypically accessible from w 
 
The use of IS sentences is governed by the following rule:  
 
(25) An IS sentence is true in w iff 
 ∃ S ∀w’[∀x[[P(x,w’)] → [S(x,w’) ∧ S is associated with P]] → 
 ∀x[[P(x,w’)]→ [Q( x,w’)]]] 
 
Though appealing, this account raises some concerns with respect to the treatment of 









(26) Des leaders violents sont dangereux  
 ‘Des’ (plural indefinite) violent leaders are dangerous 
 
The first one is to assume, along the lines of what Greenberg suggests for a similar case, 
that violent leader is associated with a related property, which causes danger.  
 
(27) a.  Des leaders violents sont dangereux (in virtue of some associated property) 
 b.  ∀w’[∀x[[violent leaders(x,w’)] → [some associated property (x,w’)]] → 
  ∀x,s[[leader(x,w’)]→ [dangerous(s, x,w’)]]] 
 
However, what the sentence expresses is that leaders are dangerous in virtue of being 
violent (Rooth, 1995; Vogeleer and Tasmoski, 2005). Casting this interpretation in 
Greenberg’s framework leads to conclude that leaders are violent by nature. 
 
(28) a.  Des leaders sont dangereux (in virtue of being violent) 
 b.  ∀w’[∀x[[leaders(x,w’)] → [violent (x,w’)]] → ∀x[[leader(x,w’)] → 
  [dangerous(s, x,w’)]]] 
 
This shortcoming seems sufficient to reconsider the account, while keeping its 
motivation: IS sentences rely on a particular kind of accessibility relation (or restriction 
of the modal basis).  
 
4 Point of views  
 
In what follows we argue that point of views can be treated as restrictions of the modal 
basis and that different lexical, syntactic and discursive phenomena set point of views.  
 
4.1  Point of views as modal basis restrictors 
 
Point of views are known in the literature under the terms of frame (Nunberg, 1975); or 
media (Ross, 1997). These are considered to be sets of content-coherent propositions. In 
this paper we adopt a broader notion that includes not only spaces, but also perspectives  
that the speaker adopts to draw certain conclusions. A proposition is true or relevant in 
virtue of being considered under a particular perspective, but false under a different one. 
Charolles (1997) has shown in detail that there are two different kinds of respects: 
spatiotemporal (23a) and epistemic (23b). These correspond to easily recognizable 
expressions in natural language, which, preferably occupy the left periphery.  
 
(29) a.  In Europe, people eat five servings of fruits per day 
 b.  According to the doctor, you have to stay home 
 
In formal terms, the modal Kratzerian framework indirectly introduces viewpoints as 
conversational backgrounds. Kratzer (1981) proposes that modal doxastic and deontic 





utterances exploit modal bases, i.e. set of worlds and an ordering relation. w'≤ w means 
that w' is preferred over w along the dimension with respect to which the worlds in the 
modal basis W have been chosen. In the same line of thought, in our account, 
viewpoints determine the modal basis. Worlds that are selected under a certain 
viewpoint support the same information i.e. are worlds in which the same laws hold. In 
other words, worlds that belong to the same modal basis are characterized by a set of 
coherent propositions. Let us call a pair m1 =(W, ≤ ) a modal viewpoint.  
 
(30) p → q is true in m1  iff for every w where p is true, there is a world w' such that 
(i) w'≤ w,  
 (ii) p ∧ q is true at w' and for every world w' such that w' ≤ w', p  → q is true at 
w'. 
 
The intuition behind (30) is that if p is true somewhere in W, there must be a world at 
least as normal as the world where p is true and p → q is true there and down through 
the world sequence. In other words, from w one can always reach the point where p → 
q becomes irreversibly more normal then p ∧ ¬q . (see definition 6, Kratzer, 1991). 
 
The formalization of point of views requires further elaboration, though. Ross (1997) 
clearly presents the reasons for adding a judge parameter to the world parameter. 
Assume two superposed circles (Figure 1): a white and a black one, in a world w. The 
truth of the proposition “the black circle is on top of the white one” depends on the 
judge: it is true for judge i2, and false for judge i1. Under this account, a point of view is 
determined by a world-judge pair. 
 
Figure 1 (Ross, 1997) 
 
(31) amends (30). Let us then call a pair m = < <W,I> , ≤  > a modal viewpoint.  
 
(31) p → q is true in m iff for every <w,i>  where p is true, there is a world <w’,i> 
 such that (i)  <w',i>  ≤  <w,i>,  (ii) p ∧ q is true at <w',i> and for every world 
 <w',i> such that <w',i> ≤ <w,i>', p → q is true at w'. 
 
(31) expresses the fact that a proposition p → q becomes irreversibly more normal then 










Assuming that point of views are world-judge pairs, the interpretation of generic 
indefinites is as follows:  
 
(32) IS sentences are true at w iff:  
 ∀<w’,i>[[<w’,i>  ≤ <w,i>] → ∀x[P(x,<w’,i>) → Q(x,<w’,i>)]]   
 Paraphrase: in all maximally similar accessible worlds, under the point of view 
 of judge i, the proposition ∀x[P(x) → Q(x)] is true. 
 
In the next session we show that the phenomena presented in section 3 are evidential 
strategies that instantiate point of views in the sense of (32)5.  
 
4.2 Some evidential strategies in French 
 
According to our definition of point of view, the truth of the generic sentences holds in 
all worlds accessible from the actual one, in which the point of view of the speaker 
holds. Before presenting out account of the data, we make explicit a constraint that is 
associated with point of views. 
 
(33)  Contrastiveness constraint associated with points of views. The proposition p 
expressed by assertion a must be overtly marked as true only relatively to a 
specified judge.    
 
Default parameters are not sufficient for satisfying the constraint, which is naturally met 
whenever two contrasting views are involved.  
 
Contrastive topic containing a focused phrase is standardly taken to introduce the 
presupposition that the focus value is part of a set of alternatives (Rooth, 1985; Büring, 
2003). Building on Büring’s (2003) view that contrastive topics are bound to discursive 
contexts in which different sequences are put in place (questions-subquestions or, 
question-answers pairs), we reinterpret alternatives in a dialogic framework in which 
every alternative is associated with a different index for the A(SSERT) (Jacobs, 1984) 
operator, i.e. to different participants/different moves of the same participant.  
 
(34)  [Un CHIenF]CT [est INTelligentF] COMM 
 = {As, x, P | As ∈ {speaker, hearer, other participants} | {x ∈ {chien, chat, 
 …} | P ∈ {intelligent, stupid, ….}}  
 = {{{speaker, dog, intelligent; speaker, dog, stupid}, {speaker, cat, intelligent; 
 speaker, cat, stupid}}, {{hearer, dog, intelligent; hearer, dog, stupid}, … }} 
 
It is then clear how the contrastiveness constraint get satisfied: the proposition a dog is 
intelligent is bound to a participant, in contrast with other propositions, bound to 
different participants. The legitimate interpretation for (34) is (35), which expresses that 
                                                 
5See also Matthewson, David & Rullman (2007) and their treatment of evidentials in St’at’imcets.  





the causal relation between dogness and intelligence holds according to judge i, in 
contrast to at least a different judge.  
 
(35) ∀< w’,i>[[w’ maximally similar accessible from w & i is the speaker] → 
∀x[dog(x,<w’,i>) → intelligent(x,<w’,i>)]]  
 Paraphrase: in all maximally similar accessible worlds, under the point of view 
of the speaker, a dog is intelligent  
 
Other contrast strategies. Another contrast strategy consists in comparing two indefinite 
generic sentences, in which the association with focus operator is itself focused. This 
way, a framework is set in which (i) every sentence brings its own silent A operator; (ii) 
the overt association with focus operator, being focused itself, gets bound by the A 
operator.  
 
We then obtain a scenario in which the speaker asserts one among different propositions 
(which as before could have been endorsed by other participants). For signaling that in 
the subsequent sentences the speaker is endorsing one among the other possibilities, we 
change the index of the second A operator. The contrastiveness constraint is again 
satisfied6. (We spouse the view according to which negation works in association with 
focus). 
 
(36)  ASSERT1[Un CHIenF1]CT [est INTelligentF1]COMM, ASSERT2[un CHATF2]CT 
 [NONF2]COMM / A dog is intelligent, a cat is not 
 = {As, op, x, P | As ∈ {speaker, hearer, ….} | op ∈ {no, too} | {x  ∈{dog, cat…} 
 | P ∈ {intelligent, stupid, ….}}  
= {{{speaker, no dog intelligent; speaker, no, cat, intelligent},{speaker, yes, dog 
intelligent; speaker yes cat intelligent}}, {{hearer, no, dog, intelligent}, {hearer, 
no, cat, intelligent}, {hearer, yes, dog, intelligent; hearer yes, cat, intelligent}}} 
 
Evidentials proper. Besides providing information about the degree of confidence of the 
source of the belief/thinking … the predicates croire, trouver and savoir have the 
primarily function of overtly specifying the source of the evidence. This is not enough 
for satisfying the contrastiveness constraint. Besides trouver which is specialized for 
expressing irreducibly attitude holder oriented beliefs, savoir and croire require extra 
material for fulfilling the contrastiveness constraint, respectively focus (enhancing the 
interpretations mentioned in section 2 (see Simons, 2007)) and approval request. In 
these cases, the following interpretation is legitimated7.  
 
 
                                                 
6This trick allows us to render justice of the dialogic dimension when one participant is involved.  
7The contrastiveness constraint is also naturally fulfilled by focused adverbs expressing probability 
expectations of the speaker. The same reasoning as above applies 





(37) ∀<w’,i> [[w’ maximally similar accessible from w & i is the speaker] → 
∀x[dog(x,<w’,i>) → intelligent(x,<w’,i>)]]  
 Paraphrase: in all maximally similar accessible worlds, under the point of view 
of the speaker, a dog is intelligent 
 
Modalities. The treatment we have proposed here for indefinite generics shares the 
basics insights of Stephenson (2006) after McFarlane (2006): epistemic modals 
introduce a parameter for the holder of the belief. Crucially, again, either the modal has 
to be stressed, or the sentence has to be used in polyphonic contexts, in which the belief 
is questioned. Bringing in other epistemic evaluations bound to other participants, the 
contrastiveness constraint is satisfied. 
 
(38) [Une fille]TOPIC [[peutF] aller à l’école]COMM 
 ∃<w’,i> [[w’ maximally similar accessible from w & i is the speaker] → 
∀x[girl(x,<w’,i>) → go_to_school(x,<w’,i>)]] 
 
We suggest treating indefinite generics with deontic modals in a similar way. It is the 
case that this kind of sentences (expressing p) are uttered in contexts where it is not 
necessarily put into practiced that p or in exception configurations. By uttering (15), the 




The account we have proposed for generic indefinites pleads in favor of a unitary view 
of indefinites as requiring an anchoring context in any of its uses, existential and 
predicative indefinites (Mari and Martin, 2008b). We have introduced the notion of 
point of view, which, after Ross (1997) and Stephenson (2006) we have instantiated as 
world–judge pairs. Point of views come along with a contrastiveness constraints, 
requiring the truth of the proposition expressed by the indefinite generic sentence to be 
overtly signaled as relative to a judge, in contrast with at least a different judge. For a 
general theory of indefinite generic, this entails that they express a truth which is not 
based on induction, but depends on a different parameter, namely the judge. For a 
general theory of subjective meaning, this sheds new light on contrast and focus as 
bounded to a dialogic dimension, in which alternatives get bounded to different 
participants in the conversation. This treatment of focus provides a theoretical 
framework for the notion of prescription. Finally, attitude verbs are also shown to 
improve the acceptability of indefinite generic sentences since, in their evidential use, 
they (i) introduce a judge parameter, (ii) are lexically, prosodically, and discursively 
bounded to strategies that satisfy the contrastiveness constraint.  
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